Monday, March 01, 2010

Open Wound









Open Wound


Many bodies were found in mass graves
Kosovo's missing people are the ghosts that haunt the birth of the state.
When the Kosovo war ended on June 11, 1999, it left Kosovo in chaos and Yugoslavia facing an unknown future.

The number of missing people in the region went up to 8,000.

Now, more than seven years later Marti Atisaari, the UN's special envoy, has a plan for Kosovo to pave the road to independence, but many families still want to know what happened to the family members and friends who are still missing.

The overwhelming majority of the war's victims were ethnic Albanian civilians massacred by Serb paramilitaries, and the bodies of thousands were driven across the border, often in refrigerated lorries, as part of a cover-up orchestrated by Belgrade.

In the rush to dispose of the evidence, some of the trucks were driven into the Danube river.

After Slobodan Milosevic was toppled in 2000, the Serbian police found the remains of hundreds of bodies buried near a village called Batajnica, about 15km northwest of Belgrade.

With unique access to their stories secured by Eki Rrahmani - who has been covering Kosovo since 1999 - People & Power capture an intense journey in which we meet the families of the missing people on the both sides of the conflict.


17.02.2008
Në ditën kur në Prishtinë po festohej dhe po ngrihej edhe një shtet i ri në botë, në kanalin tejoqeanik Al Jazzera doli një storie e dhimbshme. Në këtë kanal televiziv u tregua historia prekëse dhe e dhimbshme e atyre që sot nuk janë në mesin e të gjallëve.
Në Al Jazzera u fol për ata, të cilët sot janë të varrosur apo për ata që tash e 8 vite nuk dihet se ku janë. Këtë dokumentar në Al Jazeera e ka sjellë regjisori nga Kosova Eki Rrahmani si dhe Ilir Kabashi.
Dokumentari i Rrahmanit, i transmetuar në emisionin e njohur People and Poëer, udhëton që nga rrëfimi i dhimbshëm i familjes Qerkezi nga Gjakova për të vazhduar më pas në Krushën e Vogël, e deri tek të rrëfimi i të zhdukurve serbë në Kosovë.
Ky është realitet që ka ndodhur, ndonëse dhimbja ende vazhdon. Burokracia dhe loja e institucioneve të vendit dhe të UNMIK-ut nuk harrohet të përmendet në dokumentar, sepse edhe ata kanë gisht në moszbardhjen e fakteve. Fajtorët në dy palët ende shëtisin të lirë rrugëve, derisa familjarët e viktimave sot e kësaj dite presin lajme për ta.
Rrahmani thotë se e ka ditur që media perëndimore do të koncentrohet vetëm në status dhe duke lënë anash një histori e cila sot e kësaj dite i ka plagët e hapura.
“Unë dëshiroja ta qes një storie që tregon plagën, që ende nuk është mbyllur. Janë harru ato gjërat që këtu ka pas luftë që kanë hequr ata njerëz dhe që ende heqin” , tha Rrahmani.
Ndërsa vendimi për transmetimin e dokumentarit, sipas tij, ka qenë vendim i dy palëve. Ndërsa Rrahmani tregon se Al Jazzera ka vendosur që emisioni People and Power t’i kushtohet Kosovës. Ndërsa, sipas Rrahmanit, reagimet pas transmetimit të këtij dokumentari janë të mira.
“Shumica e komenteve janë të mira. Unë jam mundu që edhe UN
me paraqit që nuk ia ndien shumë për këta njerëz”, tha Rrahmani.
Dokumentarët e tjerë që do të shfaqen në këtë emision, do të fokusohen
në festimin e pavarësisë së Kosovës. (nga Milot Hasimja, G. Express)

Monday, July 20, 2009

Kosovo’s costly World Bank membership

Found at: http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/11603/1/407/>
Kosovo’s costly World Bank membership
Osservatorio Balcani Osservatorio English News
Publishing date: 20.07.2009 10:44

(Santinbon/flickr)
Membership in the World Bank costs Kosovo greatly because it must pay its portion of the old Yugoslav debt. As outlined by the Ahtisaari plan, membership comes despite Kosovo not receiving any assets deriving from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Belgrade’s continuing politics to pay Kosovo’s foreign debt, as part of Serbia’s general debt, is breaking down
In July 2008, when Kosovo applied to join the world’s leading financial institutions – the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank – citizens heard promises and plans for securing future development funds for capital investment, but there was little warning that Kosovo had to first pay inherited debts.

At the beginning of July 2009, after they signed the membership accords with the Bank and the IMF, Kosovo leaders agreed to pay a World Bank debt of 231 million dollars for loans obtained during the 1980s in Yugoslavia.

Kosovo’s original debt was 381 million dollars, but the US stepped in and agreed to pay 150 million dollars of the debt.

These agreements marked a milestone between Kosovo and international institutions after Kosovo declared independence on February 2008. Many believe that Serbia had agreed to delegate this particular debt to Kosovo but had preferred to not make it a public issue, but rather keep silent.

However, the foreign debt for the newest state in Europe does not end with the World Bank. According to the Serbian government, the alleged debt is estimated to be 1.2 billion dollars. Kosovo authorities, on their side, claim that foreign debt is much less than a billion dollars. Aside from the World Bank, the loans have been negotiated through the Paris Club, an informal group of financial officials from 19 of the world's richest countries, and the London Club – an informal group of private creditors on the international stage.

These loans had financed capital projects in Kosovo during the 1980s, and were signed in the name of Kosovo People’s Bank and the Yugoslav Federation. The banks in Kosovo were nationalised during the Milosevic regime in the 1990s, which today makes Serbia the only entity eligible to manage the payments.

Political institutions in Pristina have agreed to repay the money spent in projects implemented in Kosovo. Because of a special clause in the Ahtisaari Plan (developed by Martti Ahtisaari, the former UN mediator in the Kosovo status talks), the Kosovo constitution included responsibility for the debt. Adopted in March 2007, the Ahtisaari plan foresaw an agreement between Pristina and Belgrade on the debt issue. If there was no agreement, then an international arbitrator should mediate the foreign debt.

None of this has happened because Serbia has not signed the Ahtisaari Plan and thus does not feel obliged to it, as the plan recommended supervised independence. Belgrade continues its battle and to demonstrate that Kosovo is a part of Serbia still does not give up on paying Kosovo’s foreign debt.

Politicians in Serbia are divided on this issue. Serbian Minister of Finance Mladan Dinkic requests the Government to stop paying Kosovo’s debt since it declared independence. After Kosovo announced independence, Dinkic declared, “It is foolish to continue servicing Kosovo’s debt,” He considers that it is unfair for taxpayers in Serbia to pay for loans taken for constructing facilities in cities in Kosovo where not even a single Serb lives today.

The other camp, led by Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic and President Boris Tadic claim that by giving up on Kosovo’s foreign debt, Serbia is also giving up on Kosovo. Officials from Serbia’s Ministry of Kosovo deeply criticise the idea of not paying the debt, when “we (Serbia) are working to return our economic sovereignty in Kosovo.”

A non-nationalistic stand comes from the Brussels-based European Economic Institute, which suggests putting the payments on hold until an international solution is reached for the status of Kosovo.

Yugoslavia’s heritage and Kosovo

Kosovo was part of Serbia in 1991, during the dissolution of Yugoslavia when all succession states assumed the debt and assets based on their participation to the economy of the federation (Badinter Arbitration Commission).

Serbia (including Montenegro at the time) had about 38% share of debts, which it would only renegotiate and continue to pay back in 2002 when it renegotiated terms with the World Bank, the Paris Club and the London Club. Economic experts say Kosovo should take responsibility for more than just 4% from Serbia’s share of Yugoslav debts, but also the assets.

The economic expert and director of the Institute for Development Research RIINVEST, Muhamet Mustafa, even proposes to officials in Pristina to give up on both debt and assets, as it would save all sides from long procedures.

However, he notes that Belgrade is somehow trying to impose on Kosovo the obligation to pay the inherited debt but not take part in asset succession which benefited constituent regions following the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Mustafa, who also represented Kosovo in the 2006 discussion with Serbia on economic issues, which were finalised with the Ahtisaari Plan, says, “If Serbia wants to normalise relations with Kosovo then it has to agree on both assuming foreign debt, repay Kosovo for all war damages during the 1990s, including expulsion of 70% of public servants, damages to the autonomous budget worth billions, robbing of pension system and savings worth hundreds of millions of euros.”

The Vetevendosje (Self-determination) movement also called on the government not to pay the debt, as outlined by the Ahtisaari Plan, until Serbia repays Kosovo for damages caused during the war and return the country’s capital owed to it from the breakup of Yugoslavia.

In case Kosovo decides to take over the debt and pay for loans spent in Kosovo, then Serbia’s cooperation is necessary since Pristina does not hold the original contracts and documents supporting the claims.

GAP Institute, a Pristina-based think tank, recommends that Pristina express its willingness to take over servicing of the debt that was used for projects in Kosovo. A GAP position paper notes, “Kosovo should not deny the obligation, and in the path towards developing a sustainable and a respected state, it should recognize the moral obligation to take over the debt that belongs to Kosovo.”

These calls come at the time when Kosovo is preparing to ask for loans to fund capital investments. The head of the institute, Shpend Ahmeti, stresses further that Kosovo should have asked from the donor conference in July 2008 to repay all its foreign debts, instead of pledging 1.2 billion euros in projects.

Ahmeti says, “Kosovo would get rid of an old burden, avoid inflation, while now most of the project money from the donor conference is spent on consultants coming from EU countries.”

Upon the recommendation of IMF, Kosovo has, since 2008, set aside 50 million euros from its budget in order to be prepared to pay for its foreign debt. Currently the IMF warned the government on its increased expenditures, arguing that it is spending more than it can afford and is adopting laws without being certain it can support them financially. The body has also appealed to abandon plans for increasing public sector expenditures before local elections in November this year.

Serbia could put more pressure on the Kosovo government and allocate the rest of the debt it is paying to Paris Club and London Club. However, such a move would mean that Serbia acknowledges Kosovo as an international subject towards world bodies, as demonstrated with Kosovo’s World Bank debt.

Serbia, alongside Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to secure loans worth hundreds of millions of euros recently, an indicator of a serious borrower, which Kosovo has yet to prove. This means that Pristina has to set aside more than 50 million euros a year in order to handle the inherited debt and the fresh loans – with which it wants to finance road-infrastructure projects and its new energy plant.

In the future, when the Kosovo government proclaims “victories” such as IMF and World Bank memberships, it would be good to inform the citizens/taxpayers, as an indicator of responsibility, the burden brought by being an independent international subject.

Friday, July 10, 2009

Suha Reka Massacre

Police officer recalls Berisha murders
9 July 2009 | 12:38 | Source: Beta
THE HAGUE -- Police officer Velibor Veljković has confirmed before the Hague Tribunal that his colleagues killed several dozen members of the Berisha family in Kosovo.


Vlastimir Đorđević (Beta-AP, archive)


As a witness at the trial of former MUP Public Security Chief Vlastimir Đorđević, he claimed that he had not seen the actual murders themselves, but he pointed the finger at officers Slađan Čukarić, Radovan Tanović and Miroslav Petković, who had been under the commander of then Suva Reka Police Chief Radojko Repanović.

Veljković said that he and others had carried bodies out of the café where the crime had taken place and piled them on to a truck.

He explained how he had seen an old woman and man still showing signs of life, and how the police had then executed them.

The witness said that he had bumped into Čanović, Tanović, Petković and Repanović in front of the police station at about midday on March 26, 1999.

Repanović then ordered him to do “something that would be considered a crime,” which he had refused to, the witness said, adding that he could not remember the details.

He said that he had then entered the station just as an Albanian, Petrit Elshani, was being hastily led out, having spent some time in custody.

“I heard shots, and when I walked out he was dead, and Čukarić, Tanović and Petković were standing around him,” he said.

The three officers and Repanović then made towards the Berisha family house, from where an explosion and shots were heard shortly afterwards.

Veljković said that he had seen civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly, running towards the shopping center by the bus station. Some of them fell after being shot.

He said that he had then picked up and loaded “five or six” corpses on to a truck. In the meantime, he said that he heard another explosion and more shots coming from the shopping center.

After the explosions stopped, he went over and saw many civilians lying dead in a café, and the three officers standing out front.

Without stating who had given the orders, he said that he had then participated in loading some “90 to 100” bodies, including “four- and five-year-old children,” on to the truck.

“I saw that an old woman had been wounded, but was alive, and she stretched her arms out to me…I was scared, even though I had a rifle, and I shouted that she was alive, and then someone, I don’t remember who, came in and killed her… Then one older man got up, I know that he was a bus driver earlier… He said: ‘You’ve killed my whole family, at least leave me.’ I ran outside and then someone, I don’t remember who, killed him,” Veljković said.

Shireta Berisha, who survived the massacre in Suva Reka in which four of her children were killed, testified earlier in the trial. Only two others survived along with her.

According to the indictment, Serbian police killed more than 45 members of the Berisha family in the café.

Čukarić and Repanović were recently sentenced to 20 years in jail each for the crimes, while Petković received 15 years. Security official Milorad Nišavić was sentenced to 13 years in prison.

Police officer Radovan Tanović, who also participated in the crimes, was later killed during the Kosovo war.

www.b92.net 1995 - 2009.

Saturday, July 04, 2009

Serbian aim to kill all Kosovans is nothing new

Serbian aim to kill all Kosovans is nothing new

The leading Serb historian Vaso Cubrilovic wrote: "At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews . . . the shifting of a few hundred thousand Albanians will not lead to the outbreak of a world war". He recommended a series of measures: the enforcement of laws to make economic activity by Albanians impossible, the "ill-treatment of their clergy, the destruction of their cemeteries", and "secretly burning down their villages and city quarters". All of these measures were adopted.

By Fintan O'Toole (The Irish Times), 1999

Here is the Catholic archbishop of Skopje, Macedonia, writing to the Pope about the situation in Prizren in the neighbouring province of Kosovo: "The city seems like the Kingdom of Death. They knock on the doors of the Albanian houses, take away the men, and shoot them immediately.
In a few days the number of men killed reached 400. As for plunder, looting and rape, all that goes without saying; henceforth, everything is permitted against the Albanians, not merely permitted but willed and commanded."

Or consider the testimony of a Ukrainian newspaper correspondent in Kosovo. A Serbian officer has told him the worst atrocities are committed by irregular paramilitary bands.

"Among them were intellectuals, men of ideas, nationalist zealots, but these were isolated individuals. The rest were just thugs, robbers who had joined the army for the sake of loot." He concludes that "the Serbs . . . in their endeavour to correct data in the ethnographical statistics that are not quite favourable to them, are engaged quite simply in the extermination of the Muslim population."

These stories could be multiplied many times over from any number of reports on the situation in Kosovo. But the dates are worth noting. Both of these accounts, cited by Noel Malcolm in his book Kosovo: A Short History, were written in 1913. The first, by Archbishop Lazar Mejda, included an estimate that 25,000 Albanians had by then been massacred in Kosovo. The second was written by Lev Bronstein, afterwards known as Leon Trotsky, then an obscure journalist. Though he had seen much violence already in Russia, he was deeply shocked by the viciousness of the assault on the general Albanian population which followed Serbia's invasion and annexation of Kosovo in 1912.

It is worth recalling these events because they put into perspective what is happening in Kosovo now. It is easy to assume that the all-out Serbian assault on the Albanian population there is a response to NATO's bombing campaign. No one reading accounts this week of the terrible massacre of Albanians at Mej defends what the Serbs are doing. But many do believe that things would be better were it not for the bombing, that the Serbs have been somehow maddened by the air raids. This is to misunderstand the deep-seated impulse within Serb nationalist ideology towards the extermination of the Kosovans.

It's important, when such impulses are discussed, that we make certain things clear. One is that what is going on is not an inevitable working-out of immemorial animosities, some pathological aberration bred in the Balkan bone. On the contrary, what we are talking about is something quite recent, a 20th-century response to 20th-century conditions.

And it must be stressed that all of this has no more to do with the Serb character than, say, the Omagh bombing is an expression of the Irish character. It's about a specific political ideology, developed in very particular circumstances over the last century and exploited for very particular political purposes over the last 15 years by Slobodan Milosevic and those around him.

An analogy with Nazism is useful. There was, even in the 19th century, a strong strain of antiSemitism in Germany. It was what historians call "eliminationist", geared towards the physical removal of the Jews from Germany. But in conditions of crisis, and under the ideological direction of Hitler and his party, it became "exterminist".

The same kind of movement is evident in the dominant strain of Serb nationalism. A desire to get the Albanians out of Kosovo has slipped, in conditions of crisis and ideological exploitation, into a desire to eliminate the Kosovans altogether.

These genocidal tendencies are not a product of NATO's bombing campaign. They were evident in 1912 and 1913, when Serbia first invaded Kosovo. They were implicit in the policy, after the formation of Yugoslavia, of denying the very existence of the Kosovans: the Yugoslav government told the League of Nations in 1929 that "there are no national minorities" in what it called "Southern Serbia". They were evident in the fierce suppression of the language and culture of the Kosovans and the assassination of their intellectuals and writers.

The aim, essentially, was to push the Kosovans into exile by making their lives unbearable. In 1937, for example, the leading Serb historian Vaso Cubrilovic wrote: "At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews . . . the shifting of a few hundred thousand Albanians will not lead to the outbreak of a world war". He recommended a series of measures: the enforcement of laws to make economic activity by Albanians impossible, the "ill-treatment of their clergy, the destruction of their cemeteries", and "secretly burning down their villages and city quarters". All of these measures were adopted.

This strain of Serb nationalism was largely buried during the Tito years, but reemerged after the collapse of the Communist regime. After Milosevic came to power, on the back of his promises to "defend" the Serbs of Kosovo, Kosovo's autonomy was withdrawn and a systematic oppression of the Kosovans was resumed. This was not oppression for its own sake. It was aimed at the actual removal of the Kosovo Albanians.

Arkan, the notorious gangster and war criminal, who was elected to the Serbian assembly as a "representative" of Kosovo in elections boycotted by the Albanian population, made this quite clear. Most of the Kosovans, he explained, had come in from Albania in the last 50 years and they ought to be regarded as "tourists".

This claim is, of course, utterly ludicrous, even by the standards of Serb nationalist rhetoric. But it's not meant as a rational argument. It is an implicit demand for the mass expulsion of the vast majority of the population of Kosovo. Tourists, after all, go "home", in this case presumably to Albania.

All of this predates NATO's involvement. None of it was a response to any action by the international community or, indeed, by the Kosovans themselves who persistently sought peaceful solutions. It has no more to do with foreign interference than Hitler's assault on the Jews had. It was axiomatic for the dominant strain of Serb nationalism that, sooner or later, one way or the other, the Kosovans were to be eliminated. Their obliteration was fundamental to the whole Serb project as envisaged by Milosevic and his allies. The achievement of this aim was a matter of timing and tactics, not of principle.

Tuesday, June 02, 2009

Bosnian Institute News: 1991 - the acquired rights of Kosovo

1991 - the acquired rights of Kosovo

Author: Christian Staub
Uploaded: Tuesday, 02 June, 2009

Brief article based on the author's substantial 'Kosovo - a legal analysis',recently published in German

Since the UN General Assembly granted a request on the matter from Serbia, the International Court of Justice in The Hague will now consider the question - on which expert opinion is divided - as to whether the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo on 17 February 2008 was in accordance with international law. In this context, the author of the following contribution considers it useful to recall the status of Kosovo in the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, and until the final collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, and the resulting consequences.

The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 brought about very significant changes in the whole state organization of Yugoslavia. It expressed roughly the then prevailing opinions, as well as the desire of each people to lead its own national, political and even economic existence within a prosperous Yugoslav state. The organizing principle which was implemented in order to guarantee an orderly and equitable coexistence of individuals and peoples within Yugoslavia was described as co-operative federalism. On this basis, the 1974 Constitution devolved extensive rights and obligations to members of the Federation, and established between them a mutual cooperation based on equal rights.

The legal status of Kosovo

Few people know about the status of Kosovo as a unit distinct from the other Federation members, and normatively fully fledged, under the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. Kosovo was placed on an equal footing with the other seven members of the Federation (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Vojvodina) in all constitutional parts and provisions which had a normative quality; it enjoyed the same extensive constitutional and legislative autonomy, and the same participation rights in the Federation. The whole territory under the Kosovo constitution, which had been adopted by virtue of the Federal Constitution upon which it was based, could not be altered without Kosovo's consent. Even a change in the external borders of Yugoslavia, guaranteed by international law, required the consent of Kosovo. In comparison with units in other European states, the constitutional autonomy of the Federation members was so extensive that they could largely determine their own internal organization independently.

The importance attached to the Federation members, or more precisely to their constitutions within the Yugoslav legal system, appeared for example in the fact that the institutions of Federation members were independent from those of the Federation itself, so that there was basically no relationship of subordination between them in either direction. In the field of law-making, the Federal Constitution left virtually all regulative policy areas to the legislatures of member states, by and large entrusting to the Federal legislature only areas of common interest, i.e. the classic, first-ranking ones. In the area of foreign policy, all eight members of the Federation enjoyed an even stronger position, since within the framework of their limited responsibilities they operated abroad not through the agency of the Federal institutions, but independently through their own ‘foreign ministries’. The normative-legal provisions also bore on the participation rights of the members in the Federation, and on the principle of equality. Such participation rights were extensive and substantial, i.e. the volition of the eight members had a decisive influence on decision-making in the various Federal institutions. Such rights included participation of members in the constitution- and law-making of the Federation, as well as in the conclusion of certain international conventions, and the election of their own delegates in the various Federal institutions.

In the field of equality, Kosovo enjoyed a privileged status within the Federation, where its citizens on the basis of the Federal, Kosovar and Serbian constitutions held a kind of ‘dual citizenship’. Thus they could take part in their own law- and constitution-making as well as in those of Serbia. That did not mean, however, that Serbia could interfere with the constitutional order of Kosovo: on the territory of Kosovo, Serbia had no authority. While Kosovo enjoyed equality with other Federation members according to the relevant normative-legal constitutional provisions, this was not the case in its denomination, nor in those provisions which did not have a normative character, i.e. were qualified as not legally binding because of their descriptive, programmatic or declaratory nature. While a full-fledged Federation member according to the normative provisions, Kosovo was not described as a republic in the constitutional text, but as an autonomous province as prior to 1974; or, to put it differently, the other Federation members were described not as autonomous provinces, but as republics. Furthermore, in non-normative provisions of a descriptive nature, Kosovo had a lesser position as compared to other federation members. While the Federal Constitution described those Federation members which it called republics as independent states, the Federation member Kosovo - which it called an autonomous province - was described in the non-normative constitutional provisions as a community and a part of Serbia. Had the normative constitutional provisions been relied on when describing the eight Federation members and their autonomy within the Federation, that would logically have led to a single, identical definition for all Federation members. Instead the designations ‘republic’ or ‘autonomous province’ were relied on, leading inevitably to two different definitions. In jurisprudence, what is of the utmost importance in a constitutional text is not the designations, which are unimportant, nor how those unimportant designations are interpreted, but only the normative constitutional provisions.

In view of the strong position of the Federation members within the Yugoslav constitutional structure, the question was raised on several occasions of whether Yugoslavia or its eight members were sovereign: i.e. of whether, based on the normative legal provisions, the decisions of the Federation or those of its members had precedence. That question was never answered. But it was noteworthy that the eight members on their respective territories made decisions which had the same validity in relation to each other.

The period after 1974

In the following years, legal life in Yugoslavia took place in the context that the Federal Constitution had fixed in its normative provisions, in accordance with its intention to ensure the orderly co-operation and coexistence of the different peoples and of the eight members within the Federation. After Tito's death in May 1980, the Yugoslav state Presidency automatically assumed all the rights and obligations granted to it by the 1974 constitution. The Presidency was designed as a genuinely collegial organism, to which each Federation member sent a representative. The Presidency elected the President and Vice-president from among its members, for one year, according to a pre-determined order. In the name of the Presidency, the President headed the high command of the Yugoslav armed forces, and represented the country at home and abroad. Formally Yugoslavia had no president; rather, the Presidency as a collective was the head of state. In the spring of 1986, it was the turn of Federation member Kosovo. The latter’s representative on the state Presidency became its legal president, and thus the symbolic President of Yugoslavia. He exercised the function for one year without interruption. Had he for any reason been disabled for a substantial period, he would have been represented by the president of Kosovo's own Presidency. Like his predecessors, the representative of Kosovo visited European and other capitals in his capacity as the (Kosovar) president of Yugoslavia, and participated in many multilateral encounters.

Partial revisions of the Yugoslav constitution

After a minor constitutional revision carried out in 1981, which affected neither the constitutional and legislative autonomy of Federation members nor their participation in Yugoslavia's state power, the Federal Constitution of 1974 was revised for a second time by the members of the Federation in November 1988. This second partial revision was the last before the final break-up of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It was a major constitutional revision, affecting almost all areas of the normative-legal part of the Federal Constitution, and was above all supposed to improve the Yugoslav economy, the sorry state of which was a threat. Contrary to a widespread belief that this revision of the Federal Constitution of 1974 would be at the expense of Kosovo, nothing in fact happened so far as the normative-legal position of the eight Federation members in the Yugoslav constitutional order was concerned. With respect to its normative-legal equality under the Federal Constitution, neither the constitutional autonomy of Kosovo, nor its wide-ranging legislative autonomy - i.e. its independence in the setting of provincial regulations and the determination of the province's policies - were restricted or eliminated. Nor did its equal participation in Federal power suffer any restriction. After all, the Federal Constitution granted Kosovo one more extended competence in the area of Serbian ‘foreign policy’. Apart from the performance of a ‘foreign policy’ of its own, Kosovo was also allowed to take part in Serbia’s ‘foreign policy’ when the Serbian Constitution provided for this. Besides purely Kosovar delegations which appeared outside of Yugoslavia, there were purely Serbian delegations and also, when determined by the Serbian Constitution, Serbian delegations with officials from the Federation member Kosovo.

Interference with the constitutional orders of Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo

After Milošević - de facto the sole ruler of Serbia since September 1987 - had interfered with the constitutional orders of Montenegro and Vojvodina, he managed to do the same in Kosovo in the spring of 1989. Yet, contrary to widespread opinion, Milošević did not repeal the constitutional and legislative autonomy of Kosovo. On the one hand, the Yugoslav Federal constitution provided no basis for this; on the other hand, the Constitution of Kosovo was not the subject of the vote in Prishtina in March 1989 (but rather the Constitution of Serbia). As a consequence, Serbia could not have been in any position to take away from the citizens of Kosovo their Kosovar ‘state citizenship’ based on the Federal Constitution. The Federation members Kosovo and Serbia could no more cancel each other's autonomy, defined and guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, than could Federation member Croatia, for example, legally revoke the autonomy of Slovenia. That would be as absurd as if the Land of Hamburg were in a position to revoke the constitutional and legislative autonomy of another member of the German federation, e.g. Bavaria.

Kosovo's declaration of independence and application for recognition as a state

As a consequence of Serbia's policy in the years 1989/90, designed to implement its own claims without regard for the constitutional status of other Federal units, the Federation members Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves independent in 1991. In the same year, in step with Macedonia but ahead of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and supported by a previously held constitutionally valid referendum, the population of Kosovo declared the sovereignty and independence of Kosovo. Via official letters from the Kosovar Government - also in step with the other existing Yugoslav states - it requested formal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state from the chairman of the international Conference on Yugoslavia, and from the twelve EC foreign ministers. However, the official document requesting formal recognition of the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state was never received by the Badinter Commission.

After this, and until the Dayton Agreement of late 1995, Kosovo decided to follow the path of non-violent resistance in the struggle for the liberation of its territory, while the Kosovar government ceaselessly canvassed European governments to recognize the sovereignty and independence of the democratically constituted state. The subsequent war in Kosovo, which NATO entered on the Kosovo side, ended in success, insofar as the territory of Kosovo - as defined by the Yugoslav and Kosovo Constitutions - was completely freed. Yet, following the example of other European countries which in the distant past had been obliged to put up with severe restrictions on their sovereignty from other states, foreign institutions were also established in Kosovo, which until now have been intended - legally or de facto - to constrain its state sovereignty. Like other former Federation members, Kosovo was established as a state through the proclamation of independence and sovereignty in 1991, after the collapse of the Yugoslav constitutional order. Recognition of Kosovo as a state by all European countries and the world community on the basis of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 would, therefore, be a product of the rule of law, democracy and freedom.

On the rights of self-determination and secession in constitutional and international law

The right of secession was mentioned in the first of the nine principles set out in the Preamble to the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974. Yet those constitutional principles had no normative character. In the normative provisions and parts of the Federal Constitution, a right to leave the Federation was not mentioned; the Constitution regulated changes of state borders only insofar as all members of the Federation had to approve any changes to the external borders. The wording of the non-normative sentence where the right of self-determination was mentioned likewise related to a closed historical process, not to the fact that a new right to secede would have to be established. Thus the right to self-determination, including secession, was effectively dealt with at the time of the creation of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e. as the Federal Constitution came into force in 1974.

From the point of view of international law, the rights to self-determination and to secession are not identical with one another. The right to self-determination, which belongs to all peoples, devolves into a right to secession only in particular circumstances. The main legal problem lies in the question of what the circumstances are, in which a right of secession arises for a people or an ethnic group to secede from a state association, as a consequence of its right to self-determination being denied. Being anxious to preserve the sovereignty of existing states and their territorial integrity, international law grants to a people - or an identifiable part thereof - a right to break the former state association only in exceptional cases: when a state machinery becomes a terror apparatus that persecutes specific population groups, because under the jurisdiction of such a state such groups can not be held to an obligation to remain loyal.

Genocide is the greatest of all international crimes. Any government which resorts to genocide loses its right to expect and demand obedience from the citizens it has targeted. For, if international law wishes to remain true to its own basic premises, it must allow actual victims a means to live in dignity. In addition to a threat to the existence of a people, or its actual destruction, at the hands of the sovereignty holders of the territory in which it lives, the unusual, extreme circumstances justifying exercise of a right to secession should also include intolerable discrimination against a people because of its identity, or the denial of cultural pluralism. Of all eight members of the Federation, only Kosovo and its population were to experience such an exceptional situation, whether interpreted in a narrow or a wider sense, at least from 1989 to 1991 (and, if Kosovo is not considered as a sovereign state from that time on, after 1991 it continued to experience such an exceptional situation, most particularly in the years 1998/99).

Christian Staub (christianstaub.com) is the author of several books. This article is based on his recently published work Kosovo. Eine rechtliche Analyse (Kosovo – a legal analysis), Books on Demand 2009, Huningue, 328 pp, which also provides a comprehensive insight into the history of Kosovo

Thursday, August 23, 2007

Kosovo Independence Activist Puts Hope in 'No Negotiation' - washingtonpost.com

Kosovo Independence Activist Puts Hope in 'No Negotiation' - washingtonpost.com


Kosovo Independence Activist Puts Hope in 'No Negotiation'

By Jonathan Finer
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, August 23, 2007; A16

PRISTINA, Serbia -- Albin Kurti's is not the bookshelf of a common criminal. Philosophy tomes compete for space with poetry anthologies and memoirs by those he says he leans on for inspiration, such as Nelson Mandela.

But the man police consider Pristina's chief troublemaker is under house arrest in his fifth-floor walk-up off Pristina's Bill Clinton Boulevard. He is charged with leading a pro-independence riot in February, during which police killed two ethnic Albanian demonstrators with rubber bullets fired at point-blank range.

With a wiry physique and the dark-rimmed glasses of a graduate student, Kurti, 32, is the founder of the ethnic Albanian organization Self-Determination, whose stenciled slogan "no negotiation" is spray-painted on walls throughout Kosovo. He served two years in a Serbian jail during and after the 1999 war, which ended with the withdrawal of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army from the territory. Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations ever since, though on paper it remains a province of Serbia.

The violence in February showed the potential for broad instability as Kosovo's leaders negotiate the territory's final status in advance of a December deadline. Members of the province's ethnic Albanian majority overwhelmingly demand full independence, and many ask why they don't have it already.

"People are angry because politicians give the impression that the views of citizens are unimportant," Kurti said in a recent interview in his apartment. He argues that independence should simply be declared, not negotiated with Serbia. "Victor Hugo wrote that movements end when leaders fulfill their own ambitions. Our leaders' ambitions must be very low."

The demonstration in February was a response to a U.N. proposal that would separate Kosovo from Serbia but leave significant authority in the hands of international representatives for the foreseeable future. Protesters smashed vehicles and threw stones and glass bottles filled with red paint at government buildings and at people assigned to protect them.

Kosovo's interior minister later resigned, along with the U.N. police administrator, and the United Nations temporarily suspended use of supposedly nonlethal rubber bullets throughout the territories it governs.

A prosecutor determined that the police, Romanians who are part of an international force deployed here, had acted criminally, but declined to file charges because it was unclear who had fired the fatal shots.

While the current court order against him cites his "disdain and contempt for all that represents the legitimate authority of Kosovo," officials in Pristina reject Kurti's claim that he is a political prisoner.

"It's not complicated -- he led a violent protest. These people didn't have to die," said Capt. Veton Elshani, a spokesman for the Kosovo Police Service. "And you know what? Since he was arrested, there have been no violent protests."

Initially placed under house arrest, Kurti was sent to a prison for five months after he was found to have left his apartment to visit the families of those killed at the rally. In July he was returned home and told to remain there until his trial in September. He said he plans to represent himself.

Guarded by a pair of policemen who seem unconcerned by visitors, he relies on family and colleagues to deliver food. On a recent weekday, the six-month anniversary of the two protesters' deaths, 14 young members of Self-Determination trudged up the dingy staircase and rang his bell. He welcomed them inside.

"You need to be very disciplined," he told the nodding men, who sipped Coke from plastic cups. "We are under a lot of scrutiny now."

One guest told him about friction with Serbs, Kosovo's main minority, in a northern village. While many analysts worry about interethnic tension during the push for statehood, Kurti says the February rally targeted only Kosovo's local assembly and the international presence here, not the Serbs, victims of previous outbreaks of violence.

"The worst thing we can possibly do now is attack the Serbs," Kurti said. "It will only radicalize their enclaves and ruin our relations with them. We need to focus our energy on independence."

Tuesday, December 19, 2006

If I Wasn't Muslim

A sarcastic song about a Bosnian Muslim in Europe, surrounded by Christians neighbours.